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Introduction 
 
The ultimate sacrifice for a former Michigan president:  to give a talk in California at precisely 
the time of the Michigan-Ohio State game!!!  
 
And on the topic of university governance, no less. 
 
Some interesting quotes: 
 
In the 1850s, when the current forms of lay board governance were established, the average American 
college had fewer than one hundred students and less than 1% of while males attended college. Over the 
past century, universities have evolved from a trustees-plus-president “imperium” to a more faculty-
based hegemony to a somewhat more broadly based sovereignty that includes government (state and 
federal) and students. 
Harold T. Shapiro1 
For years now the trustees of many colleges and universities have rolled over as academics and 
administrators within the institutions they’re supposed to govern have run amok. While trustees turn a 
blind eye, faculty and administrators have politicized and dumbed down the curriculum, instituted 
draconian speech and sexual-conduct codes that they have then enforced with all the liberalism of the 
Court of the Star Chamber, and instituted an immoral and often unconstitutional system of admissions 
apartheid. 
Wall Street Journal2 
In reality, the practice of shared governance—however promising its original intent—often threatens 
gridlock. Whether the problem is with presidents who lack the courage to lead an agenda for change, 
trustees who ignore the institutional goals in favor of the football team, or faculty members who are loath 
to surrender the status quo, the fact is that each is an obstacle to progress. If higher education is to 
respond effectively to the demands being placed upon it, the culture of shared governance must be 
reshaped. 
National Commission on the Academic Presidency3 
In an attempt to improve institutional effectiveness and accountability, a call goes out for stronger 
leadership, quicker decisions, and a more business-like approach to decision-making. Battles over who has 
decision-making authority over academic policy, technology, diversity, tenure, and administrative issues 
are growing in higher education. 
William Tierney4
American universities have long embraced the concept of shared governance involving public 
oversight and trusteeship by boards of lay citizens, elected faculty governance, and experienced 
but generally short-term and usually amateur administrative leadership.  
 
Despite dramatic changes in the nature of scholarship, pedagogy, and service to society, the 
university today is organized, managed, and governed in a manner little different from the far 
simpler colleges of the early twentieth century.  
 
University governing boards comprised of lay citizens face a serious challenge in their attempts 
to understand and govern the increasingly complex nature of the university and its 
relationships to broader society.  
 
This is made even more difficult by the politics swirling about and within governing 
boards, particularly in public universities, that not only distract boards from their 
important responsibilities and stewardship, but also discourage many of our most 
experienced, talented, and dedicated citizens from serving on these bodies.  
 
The increasing intrusion of state and federal government in the affairs of the university, 
in the name of performance and public accountability, but all too frequently driven by 
political opportunism, can trample upon academic values and micromanage institutions 
into mediocrity.  
 
While faculty governance continues to be both effective and essential for academic matters such 
curriculum development, faculty hiring, and tenure evaluation, it is increasingly difficult to 
achieve true faculty participation in broader university matters such as finance, capital facilities, 
and external relations.  
 
When faculty members do become involved in university-wide governance and 
decision-making, all too often they tend to become preoccupied with peripheral matters 
such as faculty compensation or intercollegiate athletics rather than strategic issues such 
as the protection of academic values or the proper balance among undergraduate, 
graduate, and professional education.  
 
The faculty traditions of debate and consensus building, the highly fragmented and 
compartmentalized organization of academic departments, and the faculty’s primary 
loyalty to their academic discipline and the marketplace rather than to their institution 
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seem increasingly incompatible with the breadth and rapid pace required to keep up 
with today’s high momentum, high risk university-wide decision environment.  
  
University presidents and other academic administrators are all too frequently caught between 
these opposing forces, between external pressures and internal campus politics, between 
governing boards and faculty governance, between a rock and a hard place.  
 
Moreover, the imbalance between responsibility (considerable) and authority (modest) 
characterizing the contemporary university presidency inhibits strong, visionary 
leadership in higher education at a time when it is desperately needed.  
 
Little wonder that most university administrators keep their heads low, avoiding 
making waves, and polish their resume for their next career step. 
 
Today it is appropriate to question whether the key participants in shared governance–the lay 
governing board, elected faculty governance, and academic administrators–have the expertise, 
the discipline, and the authority, not to mention the accountability, necessary to cope with the 
powerful social, economic, and technological forces driving change in our society and its 
institutions.  
 
1. Can boards comprised of lay citizens, with little knowledge either of academic 
matters or the complex financial, management, and legal affairs of the university be 
expected to provide competent oversight for the large, complex institutions 
characterizing American higher education?  
 
2. What is the appropriate role for the faculty in university governance, and is this 
adequately addressed by the current determination and conduct of faculty 
governing bodies?  
 
3. Can academics with limited experience in management serve as competent 
administrators (deans, provosts, presidents)?  
 
4. And, finally (and most speculatively), what works, what does not, and what to do 
about it? 
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Before examining these issues, it is important to first stress a very important caveat. There is a 
quite remarkable diversity in the forms of governance used by American colleges and 
universities, since these have evolved from the history and traditions of a highly diverse 
collection of institutions.  
 
Beyond the obvious differences between public and private universities, liberal arts 
colleges and research universities, and those with organized (unionized faculties) and 
those with traditional faculty anarchies, there are other strong differences even among 
institutions of quite similar academic characteristics.  
 
Some institutions such as the University of California have long traditions of strong 
faculty governance at the campus-wide or system-wide level, while others such as the 
University of Michigan stress this role at the level of the academic unit through faculty 
executive committees, relying upon deans to address academic concerns at the 
university level.  
 
Some states such as Ohio and North Carolina have statewide governing boards 
determining educational policy and funding priorities; others such as California rely on 
governing boards at the university system level working within the framework of 
carefully negotiated master plans; and some such as Michigan recognize through state 
constitution or state the autonomy of a unique governing board for each college and 
university.  
 
Although this paper attempts to identify and address issues common to most colleges and 
universities, it is clearly influenced by the author’s experience with large, public research 
universities such as the University of Michigan. 
 
The Way Things Are Supposed to Work 
 
In theory, shared governance allocates  
 
• public accountability and stewardship to the governing board,  
 
• academic matters to the faculty,  
 
• and the tasks of leading and managing the institution to the administration. 
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Of course, from a legal perspective, “shared governance” is a misnomer. By law or by charter, 
essentially all of the legal powers of the university are held by its governing board. 
 
 
The function of the lay board in American higher education is simple, at least in theory:  
 
The governing board has final authority for key policy decisions and accepts both 
fiduciary and legal responsibility for the welfare of the institution. But because of its 
very limited expertise, it is expected to delegate the responsibility for policy 
development, academic programs, and administration to faculty members and other 
professionals with the necessary training and experience.  
 
In the case of private institutions, governing boards are typically elected by alumni of 
the institution or self-perpetuated by the board itself. In public institutions, board 
members are determined by political mechanisms, either appointed by governors or 
through popular election.   
 
Boards are expected first and foremost to act as trustees, responsible for the welfare of 
their institution. But, in many public institutions, politically selected board members 
tend to view themselves more as governors or legislators rather than trustees, 
responsible to particular political constituencies rather than simply to the welfare of the 
institution they serve. Instead of buffering the university from various political forces, 
they sometimes bring their politics into the boardroom and focus it on the activities of 
the institution.5 
 
There are actually two levels of faculty governance in the contemporary university.  
 
The key to the effective governance of the academic mission of the university is actually 
not at the level of the governing board or the administration but rather at the level of the 
academic unit, typically at the department or school level. At this level the faculty 
generally has a very significant role in most of the key decisions concerning who gets 
hired, who gets promoted, what gets taught, how funds are allocated and spent, and so 
on.  
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The second level of faculty governance occurs at the university level and usually 
involves an elected body of faculty representatives, such as an academic senate, that 
serves to debate institution-wide issues and advise the university administration. In 
sharp contrast to faculty governance at the unit level that has considerable power and 
influence, the university-wide faculty governance bodies are generally advisory on most 
issues, without true power. 
 
Actually, there is a third level of informal faculty power and control in the contemporary 
research university, since an increasing share of institutional resources flow directly to 
faculty entrepreneurs as research grants and contracts from the federal government, 
corporations, and private foundations. These research programs act as quasi-
independent revenue centers with very considerable influence, frequently at odds with 
more formal faculty governance structures such as faculty senates.  
 
Like other complex organizations in business or government, the university requires a high 
level of professional management and administration.  
 
While perhaps long ago universities were treated by our society--and its various government 
bodies--as largely well-intentioned and benign stewards of truth, justice, and the American 
way, today we find the university faces the same pressures, standards, and demands for 
accountability characterizing any other public corporation.  
 
Of course, the term “university administration” sometimes a sinister connotation to both faculty 
and governing boards alike, akin to the terms “federal government” or “bureaucracy” or 
“corporate organization.” In reality, however, the university administration is simply a 
leadership network that extends throughout the university. As a general practice, those 
administrative officers responsible for academic programs (e.g., department chairs, dean, 
provosts) are generally selected from among the faculty and continue to have academic rank. 
Those responsible for various administrative, support, and business functions of the university 
such as finance, physical plant, and government relations generally have experience and 
training in these latter areas.  
 
At the helm (on the bridge) of the American university is the president (or chancellor).  
 
American university presidents are expected to develop, articulate, and implement 
visions for their institution that sustain and enhance its quality. Through their roles as 
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the chief executive officers of their institutions, they also have significant management 
responsibilities for a diverse collection of activities, ranging from education to health 
care to public entertainment (e.g., intercollegiate athletics).   
 
Since these generally require the expertise and experience of talented specialists, the 
president is the university’s leading recruiter, identifying talented people, recruiting 
them into key university positions, and directing and supporting their activities.  
 
Furthermore, unlike most corporate CEOs, the president is expected to play an active 
role generating the resources needed by the university, whether by lobbying state and 
federal governments, seeking gifts and bequests from alumni and friends, or clever 
entrepreneurial efforts.  
 
Harold Shapiro noted this role was most elegantly stated in a Harper’s Magazine article 
of 1939: ”A university president is supposed to go down town and get the money. He is 
not supposed to have ideas on public affairs; that is what trustees are for. He is not 
supposed to have ideas on education; that is what the faculty is for. He is supposed to go 
down town and get the money.”6 
 
The presidency of an American college or university is an unusual leadership position 
from another interesting perspective. Although the responsibility for everything 
involving the university usually floats up to the president’s desk, direct authority for 
university activities almost invariably rests elsewhere.  
 
There is a mismatch between responsibility and authority that is unparalleled in other social 
institutions. As a result, there are many, including many university presidents, who have 
become quite convinced that the contemporary university is basically unmanageable and 
unleadable. 
 
The Challenges to Effective University Governance 
 
Effective governance of social institutions is challenging enough during relatively stable 
periods. Today, however, powerful social, economic, and technological forces are driving rapid 
change in our society. These expose the flaws in our traditional forms of governance in higher 
education and threaten not only academic values but as well the public interest. 
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Complexity: The modern university is comprised of many activities, some nonprofit, some 
publicly regulated, and some operating in intensely competitive marketplaces. It teaches 
students; it conducts research for various clients; it provides health care; it engages in economic 
development; it stimulates social change; and it provides mass entertainment (athletics). The 
organization of the contemporary university would compare in both scale and complexity with 
many major global corporations. The very complexity of the university has made substantive 
involvement in the broader governance of the university problematic for all of the participants 
in shared governance. 
 
Bureaucracy: The increased complexity, financial pressures, and accountability of universities 
demanded by government, the media, and the public at large have required stronger 
management than in the past.7 Yet as universities have developed the administrative staffs, 
policies, and procedures to handle such issues, they have also created a thicket of paperwork, 
regulations, and bureaucracy that has weakened the authority and attractiveness of academic 
leadership. Broad participation in university governance is hampered by bureaucratic policies 
and procedures and practices, along with the anarchy of committee and consensus decision-
making.  
 
The Pace of Change: Both the pace and nature of the changes occurring in our world today have 
become so rapid and so profound that our present social institutions—in government, 
education, and the private sector—are having increasing difficulty in even sensing the changes 
(although they certainly feel the consequences), much less understanding them sufficiently to 
respond and adapt. The academic tradition of extensive consultation, debate, and consensus 
building before any substantive decision is made or action taken poses a particular challenge in 
this regard, since this process is simply incapable of keeping pace with the profound changes 
swirling about higher education.  
 
The Resistance to Change: In business, management approaches change in a highly strategic 
fashion, launching a comprehensive process of planning and transformation. In political circles, 
sometimes a strong leader with a big idea can captivate the electorate, building momentum for 
change. The creative anarchy arising from a faculty culture that prizes individual freedom and 
consensual decision-making poses quite a different challenge to the university.  Most big ideas 
from top administrators are treated with either disdain (this too shall pass…) or ridicule. As 
Don Kennedy, former president of Stanford, noted, “The academic culture nurtures a set of 
policies and practices that favor the present state of affairs over any possible future. It is a 
portrait of conservatism, perhaps even of senescence.”8 
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The Deterioration in the Quality of Governing Boards 
  
Many university presidents believe–although they are understandably discrete in 
acknowledging–that one of their greatest challenges is protecting their institutions from their 
own governing boards.  
 
In theory members of governing board are expected to serve as stewards for their 
institutions, advocates for higher education, and defenders of academic values. In 
practice there has been a pronounced shift in board roles in recent years toward a 
greater emphasis on oversight and public accountability.  
 
This is particularly the case with the governing boards of public universities, determined 
as they are through partisan politics, and tending to view their roles more as overseers 
for the interests of body politic rather than as trustees for the welfare of the institution. 
As the politics of board selection have become more contentious, board members have 
increasingly advocated strong political agendas, e.g., to restructure the curriculum to 
stress a specific ideology or to reduce costs even at the expense of quality.  
 
In a sense, governing boards have become conduits for many of the political issues 
swirling beyond the campus. Political factors have become more important than 
expertise or institutional commitment in determining governing board members and 
their agendas.  
 
Beyond the dangers posed to their institutions, the burdens rogue governing boards 
place on their presidents is particularly severe: the amount of time required to 
accommodate the special interests of board members, the abuse presidents receive from 
board members with strong personal or political agendas, the increasing tentativeness 
presidents exhibit because they never know whether their boards will support or attack 
them.  
 
And yet, the accountability of most lay board members is almost nonexistent. Once 
selected, board members generally serve for long terms, subject only to removal by 
recall action by the electorate, removal for malfeasance by the courts, or peer pressure 
from colleagues. There is ample evidence to suggest that for all practical purposes, 
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governing board embers are effectively isolated from accountability for even the most 
blatant incompetence or grievous misbehavior.9 
 
There is little doubt that the deterioration in the quality of governing boards, the 
confusion concerning their roles, and the increasingly political nature of their activities 
has damaged many public universities and threatens many others.  
 
While perhaps superficially reassuring government leaders, the media, and the public 
that greater oversight and accountability is being exercised, the quality of leadership, 
faculty, and academic programs of many public universities is all too frequently at risk 
because of the political agendas of their board.  
 
There used to be an old saying that no institution can be better than its governing board. Today, 
however, the counterpoint seems to apply to many public universities: A governing board is 
rarely as good as the institution it serves. 
 
Elected Faculty Governance: Shared Governance or Shared Anarchy?  
 
While faculty involvement in academic matters is essential for program quality and integrity, 
faculty participation in university-wide governance and leadership is problematic for many 
reasons.  
 
1. First, as we have noted, the complexity of contemporary university hinders substantive 
faculty involvement in the broader governance of the university. On most campuses 
faculty suffer from a chronic shortage of information—and hence understanding—about 
how the university really works. In part, this arises because university administrations 
have attempted to shield the faculty and the academic programs from the forces of 
economic, social, and technology change raging beyond the campus. But there are 
deeper issues.  
 
2. The faculty culture typically holds values that are not necessary well aligned with those 
required to manage a complex institution. For example, the faculty values academic 
freedom and independence, while the management of the institution requires 
responsibility and accountability. Faculty members tend to be individualists, highly 
entrepreneurial lone rangers rather than the team players required for management. 
They tend to resist strong, visionary leadership and strongly defend their personal 
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status quo. It is frequently difficult to get faculty commitment to—or even interest in—
broad institutional goals that are not necessarily congruent with personal goals.  
 
3. There is yet another factor that mitigates against effective faculty governance. The 
fragmentation of the faculty into academic disciplines and professional schools, coupled 
with the strong market pressures on faculty in many areas, has created an academic 
culture in which faculty loyalties are generally first to their scholarly discipline, then to 
their academic unit, and only last to their institution. In reality, most faculty members 
care little about institution-wide issues that do not have direct relevance to their 
particular interests. This is not surprising, since most faculty members move from 
institution to institution, swept along by market pressures and opportunities, unlike 
most nonacademic staff that remain with a single university throughout their careers. 
Although faculty members decry the increased influence of administrative staff, it is 
their own academic culture, their preference for disciplinary loyalty rather than 
institutional loyalty, coupled with the complexity of the contemporary university that 
has led to this situation. 
 
4. Beyond the fact that it is frequently difficult to get faculty committed to—or even 
interested in—broad institutional goals, there is an even more important element that 
prevents true faculty governance at the institution level. Responsibility and 
accountability should always accompany authority: deans and presidents can be fired; 
trustees can be sued or forced off governing boards (at least in private universities). Yet 
the faculty, through important academic traditions such as academic freedom and 
tenure, are largely insulated from the consequences of their debates and 
recommendations. It would be difficult if not impossible, either legally or operationally, 
to ascribe to faculty bodies the requisite level of accountability that would necessarily 
accompany executive authority. 
 
5. Of course many of the most outspoken critics of faculty governance come from the 
faculty itself.  They note with dismay that many of those elected to faculty governance 
seem more interested in asserting power and influence on matters outside the traditional 
concerns of the faculty, e.g., setting budget priorities, overseeing athletic departments, 
and setting policies in peripheral areas like plant operations and parking. Tragically it 
has been difficult to get faculty governance to focus on those areas clearly within their 
unique competence–curriculum, student learning, academic values and ethics. Little 
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wonder that many of our most outstanding faculty members are reluctant to become 
involved in the tedious committees and commissions generated by shared governance. 
 
 
Turf Issues 
 
Part of the difficulty with shared governance is its ambiguity. Although most members of the 
university community understand that it rests upon the delegation of authority from the 
governing board to the faculty in academic matters and to the administration in operational 
management, the devil in the details can lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Turf 
problems abound.  
 
All too frequently governing boards become involved in management details, ranging 
from meddling with highly visible activities such as intercollegiate athletics to 
tampering with the academic process (e.g., challenging tenure at the University of 
Minnesota or specifying curriculum at SUNY).  
 
While faculty governance can work well in academic matters at the level of departments 
or schools, all too frequently faculty members attempt to extend their influence to 
broader issues beyond their responsibility or expertise. Of particular concern here is the 
tendency of faculty governing bodies to focus on the “p” issues: parking, pay, and the 
plant department–but, of course, rarely productivity.  
 
In contrast to the tendency of boards to trample on academic turf, or faculty governance 
to become preoccupied with administrative trivia, there remain a wide range of 
important institutional issues that sometimes fall through the cracks. Examples include 
crisis management, long term strategic planning, and institutional transformation. 
 
One of the key challenges to effective university governance is to make certain that all of the 
constituencies of shared governance–governing boards, administrations, and faculty–
understand clearly their roles and responsibilities. 
 
Some Prescriptions for Change 
So, what to do? In the spirit of stimulating debate and fully aware that this may be simply 
tilting with windmills, it seems appropriate to offer several suggestions: 
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Some Fundamental Principles 
 
First, it is useful to begin with several key principles. University leadership and governance, 
management and decision-making should always reflect the fundamental values of the 
academy, e.g., freedom of inquiry, an openness to new ideas, a commitment to rigorous study, 
and a love of learning. Yet, these processes should also be willing to consider and capable of 
implementing institutional change when necessary to respond to the changing needs of our 
society.  
  
Luc Weber, former rector at the University of Geneva suggests that higher education would do 
well to draw their attention two concepts from the economic theory of federalism that was 
developed to address the challenges faced by the European Economic Community.10  
 
First one should stress the importance of externality in all decisions, that is, that the 
benefits or costs of a decision accrue not only to the members of the community that 
makes it but also to the broader community it serves. In America we would recognize 
this as a “customer-oriented” strategy, focusing on those we serve.  
 
Second, a principle of subsidiarity should characterize governance in which all decisions 
ought to be made at the lowest possible level. Efforts to decentralize budget authority in 
an effort to provide strong incentives for cost containment and entrepreneurial behavior 
is a good example of this philosophy. That is, one should strive to decentralize both 
authority and responsibility to the lowest possible level, to those closest to the action in 
teaching and scholarship. Centralization is a very awkward approach to higher 
education during a time of rapid change. 
 
Structural Issues 
 
While it is probably impolitic to be so blunt, the simple fact is that the contemporary university 
is a public corporation that must be governed, led, and managed with competence and 
accountability to benefit its various stakeholders. Its broad responsibilities can best be served by 
a governing board that is comprised and functions as a true board of directors. Like the boards 
of directors of publicly-held corporations, the university’s governing board should consist of 
members selected for their expertise and experience, as well as their loyalty to the institution. 
They should govern the university in ways that serve both the long term welfare of the 
institution as well as the more immediate interests of the various constituencies it serves.  
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The academic tradition of extensive consultation, debate, and consensus building before any 
substantive decision can be made or action taken is yet another challenge. To be sure, the 
voluntary culture (some would say anarchy) of the university responds better to a process of 
consultation, communication, and collaboration than to the command-control-communication 
process familiar from business and industry.  However this process is simply incapable of 
keeping pace with the profound changes facing effective governance of the public university. 
Not everything is improved by making it more democratic.  
 
The leadership of the university must be provided with the authority commensurate with its 
responsibilities. Academic leaders, whether at the level of department chairs, deans, vice-
presidents, or even the president, should have the same degree of authority to take actions, to 
select leadership, to take risks and move with deliberate speed, that their counterparts in both 
the corporate world and government enjoy. The challenges and pace of change faced by the 
modern university no longer allow the luxury of “consensus” leadership, at least to the degree 
that “building consensus” means seeking the approval of all concerned communities before 
action is taken. Nor do our times allow the reactive nature of special interest politics to rigidly 
moor the university to an obsolete status quo, thwarting efforts to provide strategic leadership 
and direction. 
 
While academic administrations generally can be drawn as conventional hierarchical trees, in 
reality the connecting lines of authority are extremely weak. In fact, one of the reasons for cost 
escalation in higher education is the presence of a deeply ingrained academic culture in which 
leaders are expected to “purchase the cooperation” of subordinates, to provide them with 
positive incentives to carry out decisions. For example, deans expect the provost to offer 
additional resources in order to gain their cooperation on various institution-wide efforts. 
Needless to say, this “bribery culture” is quite incompatible with the trend toward increasing 
decentralization of resources. As the central administration relinquishes greater control of 
resource and cost accountability to the units, it will lose the pool of resources that in the past 
was used to provide incentives to deans, directors, and other leaders to cooperate and support 
university-wide goals.  
 
Hence, it is logical to expect that both the leadership and management of universities will need 
increasingly to rely on lines of true authority just as their corporate counterparts. That is, 
presidents, executive officers, and deans will almost certainly have to become comfortable with 
issuing clear orders or directives from time to time. So, too, throughout the organization, 
  
14 
 
subordinates will need to recognize that failure to execute these directives will likely have 
significant consequences, including possible removal from their positions. Here I am not 
suggesting that universities adopt a top-down corporate model inconsistent with faculty 
responsibility for academic programs and academic freedom. However, while collegiality will 
continue to be valued and honored, the modern university simply must accept a more realistic 
balance between responsibility and authority. 
 
Clearly an effort should be made to rebuild leadership strength at middle levels within the 
university, both by redesigning such positions to better balance authority and responsibility, 
and by providing leadership development programs. This may involve some degree of 
restructuring the organization of the university to better respond to its responsibilities, 
challenges, and opportunities.  
 
Restructuring Governing Boards 
 
Needless to say, such accountability starts at the top, at the level of the university’s governing 
board. Nothing is more critical to the future success of higher education than improving the 
quality and performance of boards of trustees.  
 
For public boards the need is particularly urgent. As long as the members of the governing 
boards of public universities continue to be determined through primarily political 
mechanisms, without careful consideration of qualifications or institutional commitment, and 
are allowed to pursue political or personal agendas without concern for the welfare of their 
institution or its service to broader society, the public university will find itself increasingly 
unable to adapt to the needs of a rapidly changing society.  
 
As the contemporary university becomes more complex and accountable, it may be time to set 
aside the quaint American practice of governing universities with boards comprised of lay 
citizens, with their clearly inadequate expertise and all too frequent political character, and 
instead shift to true boards of directors similar to those used in the private sector. Although it 
may sound strange in these times of scandal and corruption in corporate management, it is 
nevertheless my belief that university-governing boards should function with a structure and a 
process that reflects the best practices of corporate boards. Corporate board members are 
selected for their particular expertise. They are held accountable to the shareholders for the 
performance of the corporation. Their performance is reviewed at regular intervals, both within 
the board itself and through more external measures such as company financial performance. 
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Clearly directors can be removed either through action of the board or shareholder vote. 
Furthermore, they can be held legally and financially liable for the quality of their decisions–a 
far cry from the limited accountability of the members of most governing boards for public 
universities. 
 
While it is important to provide board members with sufficient tenure to develop an 
understanding of the university, it is also important to avoid excessively long tenures. It is 
probably wise to limit university board service to a single term, since this would prevent 
members from “campaigning” during their tenure for future appointment or election to 
additional terms.  
 
Again drawing on the experience of corporate boards, let me make the more radical suggestion 
that university presidents in universities should have some influence over the selection of board 
members, just as their colleagues in private universities and CEOs in the corporate sector. Here 
I am not proposing that university presidents actually nominate or select board members. But 
consideration should be given to their right to evaluate and possibly veto a proposed board 
member if the individual is perceived as unduly political, hostile, or just simply inexperienced 
or incompetent.  
 
It is my belief that all university governing boards, both public and private alike, would benefit 
greatly from the presence of either active or retired university presidents, senior administrators, 
and distinguished faculty members from other institutions among their membership. Since the 
experience of most lay board members is so far removed from the academy, it seems logical to 
suggest that boards would benefit from the experience such seasoned academicians might 
bring. After all, most corporate boards find it important to have experienced business leaders, 
either active or retired, among their membership. University boards should do the same. 
 
An equally controversial variation on this theme would be to provide faculty with a stronger 
voice in true university governance by appointing faculty representatives as members of the 
governing board. This would be similar, in a sense, to the practice of some corporate boards in 
providing a seat for a representative from organized labor. However, there would need to be a 
clear sense of accountability and liability in such an appointment, so that the faculty board 
members would not simply become advocates for the faculty position and instead be 
responsible to the entire institution. 
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Every effort should be made to convince leaders of state government that politics and patronage 
have no place in the selection of university governing boards or efforts to determine their 
administrative leadership. Quality universities require quality leadership. Even as public 
university governing boards have become increasingly political and hence sensitive to special 
interests, they have also become increasingly isolated from accountability with respect to their 
quality and effectiveness. Not only should all boards be subject to regular and public review, 
but also the quality and effectiveness of governing boards should be an important aspect of 
institutional accreditation. 
 
Some Proposals for Strengthening Faculty Governance 
 
Perhaps the simplest approach to identifying possible reforms in faculty governance is to 
examine where it seems to work well and why.  
 
From my own experience—as a faculty member, a former member of faculty governance at both 
the academic unit and university level, and a has-been university president–faculty governance 
seems to work best when focused upon academic matters such as faculty searches, promotion 
and tenure decisions, and curriculum decisions.  
 
Why? Because the rank and file faculty members understand clearly that not only do they have 
the authority to make these decisions, but that these decisions are important to their academic 
departments and likely to affect their own teaching and research activities. As a result, the very 
best faculty members, namely those with strongest reputations and influence, are drawn into 
the academic governance process, either through formal election or appointment to key 
committees (hiring, promotion, tenure, curriculum, executive) or at least consulted for 
influential opinions in their role as department “mandarins”.  
 
In sharp contrast, most active faculty members view university-wide faculty governance bodies 
such as faculty senates as primarily debating societies, whose opinions are invariably taken as 
advisory by the administration and the governing board. Hence, rare is the case when a 
distinguished faculty member will spare the time from productive scholarship, teaching, or 
department matters for such university service. Of course there are exceptions, but more 
common is the squeaky wheel syndrome, where those outspoken faculty members with an axe 
to grind are drawn to faculty politics, frequently distracting faculty governance from 
substantive issues to focus instead on their pet agendas. 
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Hence the key to effective faculty governance is to provide faculty bodies with executive rather 
than merely advisory authority, thereby earning the active participation of the university’s 
leading faculty members. Advisory bodies, paid only lip service by the administration or the 
board of trustees, will rarely attract the attention or engage the participation of those faculty 
most actively engaged in scholarship and teaching. 
 
A Balance of Interests and Influence 
 
Shared governance is, in reality, an ever-changing balance of forces involving faculty, trustees, 
and administration.11 Yet at a deeper level, it represents the effort to achieve a balance among 
academic priorities and values, public responsibility and accountability, and financial, 
management, and political realities.  
 
But different universities achieve this balance in quite different ways. For example, at the 
University of California a strong tradition of campus and system-wide faculty governance is 
occasionally called upon to counter the political forces characterizing the governing board, 
examples being the loyalty oath controversy of the 1950s, the Reagan takeover of the UC Board 
of Regents in the 1960s, and the debates over the use of affirmative action in student admission 
during the 1990s.  
 
In contrast, at the University of Michigan, campus-wide faculty governance has historically 
been rather weak, at least compared to faculty influence through executive committee 
structures at the department, school, and college level. Hence the tradition has been to develop 
a strong cadre of deans, both through aggressive recruiting and the decentralization of 
considerable authority to university’s schools and colleges, and then depend upon these 
academic leaders to counter the inevitable political tendencies of the university’s regents from 
time to time.  
 
Where is the influence of the university administration–and particularly the president–in this 
balancing act? Usually out of sight or perhaps out of mind. After all, senior administrators 
including the president serve at the pleasure of the governing board and are also mindful of 
faculty support since they may be only one vote of no confidence away from receiving their 
walking papers. While it has always been necessary for the American university president to 
champion the needs of the academic community to the board and the broader society while 
playing a role in ensuring that the academic community is in touch with society’s interests and 
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needs, it is also not surprising that the administration is usually quite reticent to get caught 
publicly in skirmishes between the governing board and the faculty. 
 
The danger of such a bilateral balance of power arises when one party or the other is weakened. 
When the faculty senate loses the capacity to attract the participation of distinguished faculty 
members, or when a series of poor appointments at the level of deans or executive officers 
weaken the administration, a governing board with a strong political agenda can move into the 
power vacuum. Of course there have also been numerous examples of the other extreme, in 
which a weakened governing board caved into unrealistic faculty demands, e.g. by replacing 
merit salary programs with cost-of-living adjustments or extending faculty voting privileges to 
part-time teaching staff in such as way as to threaten faculty quality. 
 
It All Comes Back to Values 
 
In any consideration of how our universities are governed and led, it is important to always 
begin with the basics, to launch a careful reconsideration of the key roles and values of the 
university that should be protected and preserved during a period of change.   
 
For example, how would an institution prioritize among roles such as educating the 
young (e.g., undergraduate education), preserving and transmitting our culture (e.g., 
libraries, visual and performing arts), basic research and scholarship, and serving as a 
responsible critic of society?   
 
Similarly, what are the most important values to protect?  Clearly academic freedom, an 
openness to new ideas, a commitment to rigorous study, and an aspiration to the 
achievement of excellence would be on the list for most institutions.  But what about 
values and practices such as shared governance and tenure?  Should these be preserved?  
At what expense? We need to act in such a way as to preserve our core missions, 
characteristics, and values.  
 
Only a concerted effort to understand the important traditions of the past, the challenges of the 
present, and the possibilities for the future can enable institutions to thrive during a time of 
such change. 
 
Some Final Observations  
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It is my belief that the complexity of the contemporary university and the forces acting upon it 
have outstripped the ability of the current shared governance system of lay boards, elected 
faculty bodies, and inexperienced academic administrators to govern, lead, and manage.  
 
Today far too many colleges and universities find that the most formidable forces 
controlling their destiny are political in nature—from governments, governing boards, 
public opinion, and, at times, even faculty governance bodies.  
 
Many of my university president colleagues—particularly those associated with public 
universities—believe that the greatest challenge and threat to their institutions arises 
from the manner in which their institutions are governed, both from within and from 
without.  
 
Universities have a style of governance that is more adept at protecting the past than 
preparing for the future. 
 
  
It seems clear that the university of the twenty-first century will require new forms of 
governance and leadership capable of responding to the changing needs and emerging 
challenges of our society and its educational institutions.  
 
To be sure, shared governance models still have much to recommend them, at least in 
theory if not in practice. The contemporary university has many activities, many 
responsibilities, many constituencies, and many overlapping lines of authority that are 
well addressed by the tradition of public oversight and trusteeship, shared collegial 
internal governance of academic matters, and, experienced administrative leadership.  
 
Yet the increasing politicization of governing boards, the ability of faculty senates to use 
their powers to promote special interests, delay action, and prevent reforms; and weak, 
ineffectual, and usually short-term administrative leadership all pose risks to the 
university. While shared governance may have much to recommend it, it must be 
adapted to a new time and new challenges.  
 
Governing board members should be selected for their expertise in areas related to the nature of 
higher education and the contemporary university and commitment to the welfare of the 
institution.  
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Trustees should be challenged to focus on policy development rather intrude into 
management issues.  
 
Their role is to provide the strategic, supportive, and critical stewardship for their 
institution and to be held clearly publicly, legally, and financially accountable for their 
performance and the welfare of their institutions. 
 
The faculty senate should become a true participant in the academic decision process rather 
than simply a watchdog on the administration or defenders of the status quo.   
 
Faculty governance should focus on those issues of most direct concern to academic 
programs, and faculty members should be held accountable for their decisions.  
 
Faculties also need to accept and acknowledge that strong leadership, whether from 
chairs, deans, or presidents, is important if their institution is to flourish during a time of 
significant change.  
 
Our institutions must not only develop a tolerance for strong leadership; they should 
demand it. 
 
The contemporary American university presidency also merits a candid reappraisal and likely a 
thorough overhaul.  
 
The presidency of the university may indeed be one of the more anemic in our society, 
because of the imbalance between responsibility and authority, the cumbersome process 
used to select university leaders, and the increasing isolation of “professional” academic 
administrators from the core teaching and scholarship activities of the university.  
 
Yet it is nevertheless a position of great importance, particularly from the perspective of 
the long-term impact a president can have on an institution. 
 
In conclusion, it is simply unrealistic to expect that the governance mechanisms developed 
decades or even centuries ago can serve well either the contemporary university or the society it 
serves.  
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To assign the fate of these important institutions to inexperienced and increasingly 
political lay governing boards isolated from accountability is simply not in the public 
interest.  
 
Furthermore, during such times of dramatic change, we simply must find ways to cut 
through the Gordian knot of shared governance, of indecision and inaction, to allow our 
colleges and universities to better serve our society.  
 
To blind ourselves to these realities is to perpetuate a disservice to those whom we 
serve, both present and future generations. 
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